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Alcohol-Related Car "Accidents"? The
Eighth Circuit Moves toward Policy Change
in ERISA Litigation
King v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company'
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the National Center for Statistics and Analysis,2 the 16,694
alcohol-related fatalities in 2004 accounted for 39% of all traffic deaths.3
Although declining slightly from previous years, 4 alcohol-related driving
deaths are tragic, and their devastating effects on families are readily appar-
ent. Although typically dubbed "drunk-driving accidents," courts have tradi-
tionally refused to describe these deaths as "accidental." 5 This is particularly
true when decedents or their beneficiaries attempt to collect accidental death
benefits under the Employment Retirement Income Securities Act
6("ERISA"). Focusing on the previously mentioned statistics, courts have
often reflected the social intolerance for drunk driving in their decisions.7
Courts, however, have shown signs of bending on this nearly universal
rule, particularly in light of the fact that alcohol-related fatalities occur in
only 7% of all car wrecks and the rate of alcohol-related fatalities is roughly
one for every 200 million vehicle miles traveled.8 Other commentators have
also noted that of the approximately 1.4 million drivers arrested in 2002, only
8,474 drunk drivers died in an automobile crash, and that drunk drivers make
1. 414 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2005).
2. A division of the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
("the Administration"), the National Center for Statistics and Analysis' ("the Center")
mission is to "[s]ave lives, prevent injuries, [and] reduce vehicle-related crashes."
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration Homepage,
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov. The Center also conducts research about driver behavior
and safety. Id. (follow "about NHTSA" hyperlink; then follow "Who We Are and
What We Do" hyperlink). The Administration was established under the United
States Department of Transportation in 1970. Id.
3. 2004 TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: ALCOHOL 1, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/
pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2004/809905.pdf [hereinafter Traffic Safety].
4. Id. (stating that alcohol related fatalities fell by 2.4% from 2003 to 2004).
5. See infra Part III.B.
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000); see infra Part III.B.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. Traffic Safety, supra note 3, at I (stating that the national rate of alcohol-related
fatalities to all motor vehicle crashes is 0.57 to 100 million vehicle miles traveled).
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94 million driving trips each year.9 Given this, some courts have concluded
that, objectively, it is not highly likely for an impaired driver to die in an al-
cohol-related wreck, and those deaths are therefore accidents.' 0 While not
addressing this question directly, the Eighth Circuit in King v. Hartford Life
and Accident Insurance Co. took a small step away from the universal denial
of accidental death benefits and toward the contrary holding."
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Treasure Island, a resort and casino in Minnesota, held a group insur-
ance policy for its employees as part of an employee benefit plan. 2 Hartford
Life and Accident Insurance Company ("Hartford") provided this plan, which
included provisions for accidental death benefits.' 3 As an employee of Treas-
ure Island, Martin Schanus was covered by this employee benefit plan.'
4
In June of 2000, Schanus died when the motorcycle he was driving
veered off the road and hit a fence.15 The force of the collision threw Schanus
from his motorcycle, and he suffered fatal head injuries.' 6 After the accident,
medical examiners determined that Schanus was legally intoxicated at the
time of the accident and listed "acute alcohol intoxication" as a significant
contributing factor to his death. 17
Shortly after the accident, Schanus's daughter, Amber Schanus, submit-
ted an accidental death claim with Hartford.' 8 Hartford awarded Amber the
standard death benefit 19 but denied her accidental death claim20 in a letter
21dated December 26, 2000. Citing the definition of "accident" in Black's
9. Michael E. Gardner, Note, Accidental Death Coverage of Drunk Drivers, 69
Mo. L. REv. 235, 249 (2004) (citing National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
statistics for 2002).
10. See, e.g., West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 856, 903-04 (N.D.
Iowa 2001).
11. See infra Parts IV.A., V.A.
12. King v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir.
2005). The particular benefit plan here is governed by the Employee Retirement In-
come and Security Act ("ERISA"). Id. at 997; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461(2000).
13. King, 414 F.3d at 996.
14. Id. at 996-97.
15. Id. at 997.
16. Id.
17. Id. Mr. Shanus's blood alcohol level was 0.19%. Id.
18. Id. at 1000. Amber's claim was submitted by Alane King, Amber's mother
and appellant in this action. Id. at 997.
19. Id. at 1000. The standard death benefit was $42,916.04. Id.
20. Id. The accidental death benefits would have "doubled the life insurance
benefit paid to Amber." Id. at 997.
21. Id. at 1000. Since Hartford issued two denial letters, this December 26, 2000,
letter will be referred to as "the first denial letter."
[Vol. 71
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Law Dictionary22 as something "happening by chance. . or unexpectedly,"
Hartford reasoned that by driving drunk, Schanus "voluntarily exposed him-
self to an unnecessary danger" that ultimately resulted in his death.23 More
specifically, Hartford argued that since Schanus was intoxicated, his injuries
and death were not unexpected; in fact, a person driving while intoxicated
should reasonably expect driving in such a reckless manner to produce serious
bodily injury.24 Alternatively, Hartford argued that since serious bodily injuries
could be expected from driving in such a state, and since Schanus voluntarily
became intoxicated, Schanus's death was a "self-inflicted injury.' 25
Hartford's plan contained a provision allowing denied claimants the
right to "appeal to the Insurance Company for a full and fair review." 26 Un-
der this provision, Hartford was to provide a "written decision [including]
specific reasons for the decision and specific references to the plan provision
on which the decision is based., 27 Amber exercised her right under this provi-
sion on February 21, 2001, arguing that "Hartford's denial was 'unreasonable
and not supported by the evidence."' 2
8
Hartford responded on June 14, 2001, again denying accidental death
benefits.29 In this letter, Hartford referenced its December 26 letter, stating
that it "lists the evidence" that formed the basis of the denial.30 Hartford ex-
plained, "a reasonable person would have known that death or serious injury
was a reasonably foreseeable result of driving while intoxicated.' 1 Since a
"death is not accidental when it is a foreseeable result of the insured's volun-
tary act of becoming intoxicated," Hartford concluded Schanus's death was
not accidental.32
Amber sued Hartford in a Minnesota state court, alleging the denial was
"arbitrary, capricious, and not a fair or logical reading of the policy lan-
guage."33 Hartford promptly removed the action to federal court. 4 Despite
admitting new evidence to support Amber's claim,35 the United States Dis-
22. Hartford cited to the Sixth Edition, 1990. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1000-01.
25. Id. at 1001.
26. Id. (quoting the language of the benefit plan).
27. Id. (quoting the language of the benefit plan).





33. Id. at 997. (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. Amber's claim invoked federal court jurisdiction because her claim arose
under ERISA. Id.
35. Id. The appellate court noted that this procedure violated "the general rule
that a challenge to the decision of a benefits administrator under ERISA should be
decided based on the evidence presented to the administrator." Id.
2006)
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trict Court for the District of Minnesota granted Hartford's motion for sum-
mary judgment because it found "neither Hartford's definition of its plan
terms nor its application of those terms to the facts can be considered either
arbitrary or capricious."
36
On appeal, an Eighth Circuit panel reversed the grant of summary judg-
ment and remanded for further proceedings, 37 adopting the applicable test for
an accident as "whether Schanus's death was 'highly likely to occur' as a
result of his drunk driving."38 The Eighth Circuit subsequently granted a re-
hearing en banc, vacated the panel's decision, and reversed the district court
on "narrower ground[s] than... the panel."39 In reversing, the Eighth Circuit
stated that Schanus's death was not an intentional self-inflicted injury, and
that Hartford's denial letters articulated two different interpretations of "acci-
dental bodily injury.'A Accordingly, the appropriate remedy was to return the
case to the plan administrator for reconsideration under a consistent definition
of accident using a "reasonably foreseeable standard.' ' 1
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA") 42 in response to massive growth in employee benefit plans
and the corresponding economic impact. 43 ERISA governs a vast array of
employee benefit plans covering medical, surgical and hospital care, sickness,
vacation benefits, apprenticeship or training programs, day care centers,
scholarship funds, prepaid legal services, and accidental death and disability
insurance.44 Although Congress regulates some terms of these benefit plans,
45
it gives fiduciary insurance companies wide discretion to define many policy
36. Id. The district court did express hesitation in its ruling, however, and indi-
cated that since the arbitrary and capricious standard is an "extraordinarily hard rule
of law . . . [i]t would be very pleasing ... [for] the court of appeals to take a very
careful look at this." Id.
37. King v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 357 F.3d 840, 846 (8th Cir.
2004).
38. King, 414 F.3d at 997-98 (quoting King, 357 F.3d at 844).
39. Id. at 998.
40. Id. at 1000-01.
41. Id. at 1005.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
43. Id. § 1001. Congress declared three main policy objectives in enacting the
statute: (1) protecting interstate commerce, (2) protecting federal taxing power, and
(3) protecting the beneficiaries of employee benefit plans by setting standards of con-
duct for fiduciaries of the plans. Id.
44. Id. § 1002(l)(A).
45. Id. § 1002. Section 1002, entitled "Definitions," defines such pertinent terms
as "vested liabilities," "normal service cost," "accrued liability," "normal retirement
benefit," and "accrued benefit," to name a few. Id. §§ 1002(22), (23), (25), (28), (29).
[Vol. 71
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss2/6
ALCOHOL AND ERISA
terms. One particularly problematic term not defined by Congress has been
"accident," as used in employee accident and disability plans.46 The term has
generated substantial disagreement between employee claimants and insur-
ance company carriers.47
In the event of a disagreement, a claimant has a predetermined dispute
resolution process. ERISA mandates that all employee benefit plans have two
• • 48
essential features for resolving claim disputes. First, the plan must provide
written notice to a denied claimant, and "set[] forth the specific reasons for
such denial." 49 Second, a plan must "afford a reasonable opportunity" for
denied claimants to seek "a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim." 50 ERISA does not explicitly
mandate that claimants exhaust these administrative remedies before they file
suit to collect benefits due under a plan.5 1 Nonetheless, courts have consis-
tently required denied claimants to exhaust all administrative remedies before
suing to recover benefits. 52 Courts apply the exhaustion doctrine to give effect
to congressional intent that ERISA develop its own body of substantive case
law and to give effect to the claims procedure outlined in section 1 133.:
This uniformly enforced exhaustion requirement can act as a substantial
barrier to denied claimants because courts typically apply an "arbitrary or
46. See Ronald S. Buhite & H. Maggie Marrero-Ladik, Drugs, Alcohol, and
Accidental Death Coverage, 39 ToRT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 985, 985 (2004) ("Few
issues have confounded litigants and courts more than whether a death is an accident
for purposes of accidental death insurance coverage.").
47. See generally id.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000).
49. Id. § 1133(1).
50. Id. § 1133(2).
51. Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Andrew M.
Campbell, Annotation, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as a Prerequisite to
Suit under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 US.C. §§ 1001 et
seq.), 162 A.L.R. FED. 1, 1 (2000).
52. Campbell, supra note 51, at 1. Section 1132 gives denied claimants the right
to bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B).
53. See Amato, 618 F.2d at 566-67. The Amato court explained that "in the field
of labor law," most courts require exhaustion of an administrative remedy where one
is available. Id. at 566. The court articulated four reasons to apply the exhaustion
requirement to ERISA cases. When taken together, Congress's intent to create a sub-
stantive body of case law along with its intent that ERISA cases be treated similarly to
those under the Labor-Management Relations Act, indicate that courts should apply
the exhaustion rule as they do in Labor-Management Relations Act cases, where they
have "long fashioned federal common law." Id. at 567. Third, the court noted that
ERISA itself provides guidelines on administrative remedies within the plan and the
exhaustion requirement would further those guidelines. Id. Finally, the court noted
that imposing an exhaustion requirement would assist the courts when they are called
on to adjudicate disputes by "refining and defining the problem." Id. at 568.
2006]
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capricious" or "abuse of discretion" standard of review when reviewing a
plan administrator's construction of plan terms. 54 Although de novo review
may be warranted in some instances, 55 courts usually only look to the facts
available to the administrator at the time the claim is reconsidered. 56 There-
fore, when adjudicating these disputes, courts are typically constrained by the
standard of review they apply and by the facts the administrator considered.
This process, however, is more complex when a given term is undefined or
vaguely defined in the benefit plan itself and is later defined or interpreted by
the administrator. How does a court determine if an administrator's construc-
tion is arbitrary or capricious when the applicable term is undefined or
vaguely defined within the benefit plan?
A. Definition of "Accident" within Benefit Plans
The problem of undefined or vaguely defined terms within benefit plans
is not new, particularly when the term at issue is "accident. -57 In fact, federal
courts have developed a substantial amount of case law to "fill in" the mean-
ing of "accident.,
58
54. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109-15 (1989). The
court in Bruch held that when reviewing a denial of ERISA benefits, courts are to
apply a de novo standard, unless the plan gives the administrator the power to con-
strue plan terms and determine eligibility for benefits. Id. at 115. If the plan does
confer such power, a heightened standard of review is warranted. Id. In practice, how-
ever, nearly all plans stipulate that the administrator's determinations will be given
such deference, so courts almost uniformly give heightened review. See Heaser v.
Toro Co., 247 F.3d 826, 833 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that courts "ordinarily review the
administrator's decision for abuse of discretion"); see also Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting since the plan gave the administrator
the authority to "determine[ ] conclusively" all issues relating to the plan so that its
decisions are "not subject to further review," the court was obliged to apply the "'ar-
bitrary and capricious standard"').
55. See supra note 54. In addition, courts have also determined a less deferential
standard of review is available if the denied claimant demonstrates "a palpable con-
flict of interest... caused a serious breach of the plan administrator's fiduciary duty."
West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 856, 870 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (quoting
Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998)) (quotation marks omitted).
56. Short v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567, 571 (8th
Cir. 1984).
57. See Buhite & Marrero-Ladik, supra note 46 (stating that "accident" is unde-
fined in many death coverage plans); see also Buce v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 247 F.3d
1133, 1146 (1ith Cir. 2001) (stating "unexpected, external, violent, and sudden
event" has been "charitably described as [a] 'somewhat less than dispositive"' de-
scription of accident). For a discussion of courts interpreting "accident" under Mis-
souri state law, see Gardner, supra note 9, at 237-41.
58. See Buhite & Marrero-Ladik, supra note 46, at 986-87 (describing the differ-
ent approaches courts have taken in determining the existence of a covered accident).
[Vol. 71
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss2/6
ALCOHOL AND ERISA
There are two main approaches.59 The first and older approach focuses
on the distinction between accidental means and accidental results.60 This
approach, outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Landress v. Phoe-
nix Mutual Life Insurance, extends coverage to only those injuries resulting
from accidental means.6 ' In Landress, the Court upheld a benefit denial after
a golfer suffered a sunstroke because his death "result[ed] from voluntary
exposure" to the sun.62 Justice Cardozo sharply criticized this approach in his
dissent, arguing that the proper scheme would focus on the average man's
perspective because "the man who takes out a policy of accident insurance"
would clearly view the golfer's demise as an accident. 63 This approach has
widely fallen out of favor,64 partly due to Cardozo's dissent and his prediction
that following such an approach would "plunge this branch of law into a Ser-
bonian Bog.",
65
The second, and widely followed, approach was articulated by the First
Circuit in Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance Co. 66 In Wickman, a
beneficiary wife sued for benefits due under her deceased husband's ERISA-
governed accidental death plan.67 While inexplicably walking on the outside
of a forty- to fifty-foot bridge and holding on with one hand, the husband fell
and later died in the hospital.68 After unsuccessfully trying to determine why
the husband was walking on the outside of a bridge, the court engaged in an
objective analysis of the situation and, in doing so, formulated a new ap-
proach to defining "accident.
' 69
The First Circuit examined and rejected the "accidental means" test in
favor of a two-tiered approach. 70 In the first tier, the fact-finder examines the
insured's personal expectations and determines if those personal expectations
were reasonable. 71 This step is essentially an examination of the insured's
59. Wickman v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1085 (1st Cir. 1990).
60. Id.
61. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins., 291 U.S. 491,496-97 (1934).
62. Id. at 497.
63. Id. at 499 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
64. Wickman, 908 F,2d at 1086 (noting that "[fin recent years, courts consistently
have rejected the distinction between accidental means and accidental results").
65. Landress, 291 U.S. at 499 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
66. 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990).
67. Id. at 1079. The plan defined accident as "an unexpected, external, violent
and sudden event." Id. at 1081 (quotation marks omitted). The plan also contained an
exclusion "if the loss was either directly or indirectly caused by 'suicide or intention-
ally self-inflicted injury, whether ... sane or insane."' Id. (alteration in original).
68. Id. at 1079-80.
69. Id. at 1088.
70. Id.; Buhite & Marrero-Ladik, supra note 46, at 987.
71. Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1088.
2006]
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subjective intent, asking "whether the person really meant to do himself in." 72
If the answer is "no," or if the evidence is "insufficient to accurately deter-
mine the insured's subjective expectation," the court looks to see "whether
the suppositions which [sic] underlay that expectation were reasonable." 73
This second tier of the analysis involves "an objective analysis of the in-
sured's expectations. '74 The court explained that in this analysis, "one must
ask whether a reasonable person, with background and characteristics similar
to the insured, would have viewed the injury as highly likely to occur."75 Us-
ing this approach, many courts have addressed the situation in which an in-
sured employee is killed or injured in an alcohol-related incident.
B. Alcohol-Related Car "Accidents"?
Driven by public awareness of drunk-driving, courts have traditionally
been unsympathetic to the argument that drunk driving deaths are accidents.
76
The majority of courts applying the Wickman standard to alcohol-related inju-
ries have either held that injuries are to be expected when the insured drives
while intoxicated, or that injuries sustained when driving while intoxicated
are self-inflicted.77
Fowler v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company exemplifies the first
approach.78 In Fowler, a father beneficiary sued for benefits due under his
son's employee accidental death plan.79 Although the plan administrators paid
the standard death benefits, they denied accidental death benefits because the
insured died in a single-car accident while intoxicated.80 The plan used stan-
dard language providing for accidental death benefits where "injuries [were]
effected through external, violent and accidental means, and independently of
all other causes."81 The plan also contained provisions excluding benefits for
72. Buhite & Marrero-Ladik, supra note 46, at 987. The petitioner wife in Wick-
man argued for a definition of "accident" that classified "anything short of specifi-
cally intended injury [as] an accident." Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1086. The lower court
disagreed, however, holding that "even if Wickman did not intend to kill or injure
himself, he did not die accidentally." Id.
73. Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1088. While seemingly objective in nature, the court
added this caveat to "prevent unrealistic expectations from undermining the purpose




77. See Buhite & Marrero-Ladik, supra note 46, at 987.
78. Fowler v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 938 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
79. Id. at 477-78.
80. Id. at 478-79 (noting that the decedent's blood alcohol content was .26%,
while Tennessee law creates the presumption of intoxication at. 10%).
81. Id. at 478.
[Vol. 71
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self-inflicted injuries.82 Applying Wickman 83 and using an "arbitrary or capri-
cious" standard, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee denied the plaintiff's claim, stating, "the hazards of drinking and
driving are widely known and widely publicized. It is clearly foreseeable that
driving while intoxicated may result in death or bodily harm."
' 4
Similarly, in Schultz v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a mother bene-
ficiary sued to recover accidental death benefits denied after her son died
after overturning his car.8 5 As in Fowler, Metropolitan Life denied accidental
death benefits under a similar accident plan,8 6 because the insured was intoxi-
cated at the time of death8 7 In upholding the denial under an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida applied Wickman and echoed the logic of Fowler.88 The court
stated that since the "horrors associated with drinking and driving" were well
publicized, the insured "knew, or should have known, ... he was risking his
life in a real and measurable way."
8 9
At least two courts have used a self-inflicted injury exclusion as a basis
for denying accidental death benefits in these situations. For example, the
court in Nelson v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada faced facts similar to
those of Schultz.9° The benefit plan at issue had standard language, 9' includ-
ing a self-inflicted injury exclusion.92 Using the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard, the court upheld the benefit denial on different grounds than Fowler
and Schultz. 9 3 Stating that the hazards of driving while intoxicated are well
82. Id. at 479.
83. The court also discussed the Tennessee common law definition of accident,
noting that it had "consistently held that bodily injury or death are foreseeable results
of voluntarily driving while intoxicated." Id. at 480. Although the court did not ex-
plicitly state it, the Tennessee approach is similar to Wickman, in that both approaches
look to the objective reasonableness of an actor's appreciation for expected injuries.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
84. Fowler, 938 F. Supp. at 480.
85. Schultz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1419, 1419-20 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
86. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. Although the court did not
provide the actual plan language, it summarized that an accidental death must be free
from all independent causes and must not be self-inflicted or caused during the com-
mission of a felony or serious assault. Schultz, 994 F. Supp. at 1420.
87. See Schultz, 994 F. Supp. at 1420 (explaining that the insured had a blood
alcohol content of .29%, more than three and a half times the legal limit in Florida,
and there were traces of cocaine and barbiturates in his bloodstream).
88. Id. at 1421-22.
89. Id. at 1422.
90. Nelson v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 962 F. Supp. 1010, 1010 (W.D.
Mich. 1997). Nelson involved the denial of accidental death benefits when the insured
died in a car wreck while intoxicated. Id.
91. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
92. Nelson, 962 F. Supp. at 1012.
93. See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
20061
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known, the court applied the self-inflicted injury exclusion, holding that ap-
plication of the clause was "eminently reasonable."
94
Although facing similar facts, 95 the court in Mullaney v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare reviewed the plan administrator's determination de novo.96 The
court noted that even if the decedent did not intend or foresee any harm from
driving drunk, "a reasonable person surely would have known that such con-
duct would likely result in serious bodily harm or death."97 The court ac-
knowledged the applicability of the self-inflicted injury exclusion by saying
that "any injuries or death resulting from driving while intoxicated can be
classified as 'intentionally self-inflicted.' 98 While Mullaney strongly dis-
agreed with any suggestion that drunk-driving accidents could ever be classi-
fied as "accidents," other courts have not been so absolute.
The Seventh Circuit dealt with a similar case in Cozzie v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.99 In Cozzie, a beneficiary wife sued to recover accidental
death benefits after her insured husband died after he rolled his car several
times. 00 Finding that the husband was intoxicated at the time of the wreck,
Metropolitan Life denied accidental death benefits because it was "reasonably
foreseeable" that Mr. Cozzie would suffer a fatal injury if he "got behind the
wheel .. .in such a state."' 01 Reviewing under an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard, the court hesitated to uphold Metropolitan Life's denial. The court
elaborated that although "MetLife's definition of 'accident' is [not] downright
unreasonable... [w]e do not mean to suggest that MetLife could sustain a de-
termination that all deaths that are causally related to the ingestion of alcohol,
even in violation of law, could reasonably be construed as not accidental.' 0 2
Although the holding of Cozzie was the same as previous similar cases,
it was the first case to suggest that drunk-driving deaths could be considered
accidental in some situations. At least one court has followed Cozzie's sug-
gestion, holding that a fatal accident is not necessarily a foreseeable conse-
quence of driving while intoxicated. 1
03
94. Nelson, 962 F. Supp. at 1013.
95. 103 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.R.I. 2000). The decedent's speeding truck left the
road and struck a tree, and the decedent apparently made no attempt to apply the
brakes. Id. at 488. The medical examiner determined that at the time of death, the
decedent's blood alcohol content was nearly four times the legal limit. Id.
96. Id. at 490 (stating that since the "plan at issue ... does not specifically grant
discretionary authority to the plan administrator," de novo review was appropriate).
97. Id. at 494.
98. Id. at 495.
99. 140 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 1998).
100. Id. at 1106. Cozzie did not die on impact; the coroner determined that he was
asphyxiated after the car came to rest on top of him. Id.
101. Id. at 1108.
102. Id. at 1110.
103. See West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
[Vol. 71
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C. Breaking from Prior Decisions
In West v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., the court faced remarkably similar
facts to the previous line of cases: an intoxicated driver in a single-car crash,
resulting in the driver's death. 104 After noting that the appropriate standard of
review in the Eighth Circuit was somewhat unclear, 10 the court applied an
"abuse of discretion" standard 0 6 and broke from precedent in holding that the
intoxicated driver's death was an accident.'0 7
In its analysis, the court discussed the application of Wickman to intoxi-
cated-driver cases. 10 8 The court argued that many cases such as Fowler, Nel-
son, and Cozzie, were wrongly decided because they "misapplied the second
prong of the Wickman test." 109 The court specifically noted that these cases
softened the language of the test by focusing on whether it is foreseeable that
injuries while driving intoxicated may occur.1 10 Furthermore, the court noted
many of these decisions circumvented "the complete absence of any evidence
establishing actual probability" by "substitut[ing] for actual proof. . . 'com-
mon knowledge' and media accounts that "higher blood alcohol content...
increases the probability of injury or death.""' The court concluded that
"decisive and consistent as these decisions are, this court does not find them
persuasive."",12
While the majority of cases have held that an intoxicated driver's death
is not an accident, the West court plainly rejected that line of reasoning, fo-
cusing instead on the statistical probability of serious injury in applying Wick-
man.1 13 With this background, the Eighth Circuit addressed similar issues in
the instant case.
104. West, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 860. The insured driver was on his way home from a
Christmas party when he missed a turn in the road, struck a tree, and flipped his car. Id.
"The parties d[id] not dispute that West was intoxicated at the time of the crash." Id.
105. Id. at 868-70 ("It is not surprising that there is some blurring of the applica-
ble standards in the parties' submissions, because the distinction ... has not always
been articulated so distinctly.").
106. Although the court noted the confusion within the circuit as to the applicable
standard, it muddied the waters itself by stating that "even under the most deferential
standard of review, Aetna's definition is 'unreasonable,' and hence, 'arbitrary and capri-
cious."' Id. at 897. The court applied a test articulated in Finley v. Special Agents Mu-
tual Benefit Ass'n, 957 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1992), to "determine the 'reasonableness' of
Aetna's interpretation of the plan term 'accident."' West, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 877.
107. West, 171 F. Supp. at 905.
108. Id. at 889-902.
109. Id. at 901.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 902.
113. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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The King court began its discussion by noting that since the plan at issue
gave the administrator discretionary power to construe uncertain terms, "the
administrator's decision is reviewed only for 'abuse ... of his discretion."'" 
5
The court noted the key principle in determining an abuse of discretion:
"where plan fiduciaries have offered a 'reasonable interpretation' of disputed
provisions, courts may not replace [it] with an interpretation of their own." 
116
This deferential treatment is not without limits, however. The court rea-
soned that, since ERISA requires plan administrators to "provide adequate
notice" to denied claimants setting forth specific reasons for denial, "a re-
viewing court 'must focus on the evidence available to the plan administra-
tors at the time of their decision and may not admit new evidence or consider
post hoc rationales."' 117 Explaining that "we have refused to allow claimants
'to be sandbagged by after-the-fact plan interpretations devised for purposes
114. Judges Lay, Bright, Wollman, Murphy, Bye, Melloy, Smith and Benton
joined in Judge Colloton's majority opinion. King v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 414 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir. 2005). The court was careful to point out the "un-
usual procedure" of King's presenting evidence at trial that was not before the ERISA
benefits administrator at the time of the benefit denial. Id. at 997. This new evidence
consisted of statistical evidence about the frequency of drunk-driving deaths. Id. 997
n. 1. This was contrary to "the general rule that a challenge to the decision of a bene-
fits administrator under ERISA should be decided based on the evidence presented to
the administrator." Id. at 997.
115. Id. at 998-99 (alteration in original) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989)).
116. Id. at 999 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The court also discussed
Finley v. Special Agents Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 957 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1992), an
Eighth Circuit case that listed several factors to consider when reviewing an ERISA
plan administrator's decision. King, 414 F.3d at 999. The "Finley factors" include
whether the interpretation "is consistent with the goals of the Plan[,] renders any lan-
guage of the Plan meaningless or internally inconsistent[,]conflicts with the substan-
tive or procedural requirements of the ERISA statute[,] is contrary to the clear lan-
guage of the plan[,]" and whether plan administrators have interpreted the words at
issue consistently. Id. (quoting Finley, 957 F.2d 617).
117. King, 414 F.3d at 999 (quoting Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 176 F.3d 1044,
1049 (8th Cir. 1999)). The court was careful to point out the "unusual procedure" of
King's presenting evidence at trial that was not before the ERISA benefits administra-
tor at the time of the benefit denial. Id. at 997. This new evidence consisted of statisti-
cal evidence about the frequency of drunk-driving deaths. Id. 997 n. 1. This was con-
trary to "the general rule that a challenge to the decision of a benefits administrator
under ERISA should be decided based on the evidence presented to the administra-
tor." Id. at 997.
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of litigation,"' the court surmised that the administrator "must articulate its
reasons for denying benefits when it notifies the participant."" 18
Applying these principles to the present case, the Eighth Circuit noted
that Hartford's two denial letters used slightly different language in explain-
ing why Schanus's death was not an accident.1 9 In the first letter, Hartford
denied Amber's claim because Schanus's death did not "happen[] by chance,
or unexpectedly." 120 The second letter reasoned that Schanus's death could
not have been an accident because "a reasonable person would have known
that death . . . was a reasonably foreseeable result of driving while intoxi-
cated."' 12 Despite this discrepancy, Hartford maintained that its denials were
not inconsistent because "although the decision denying ... her administra-
tive appeal applied a 'reasonably foreseeable' standard, the initial denial letter
cited Black's Law Dictionary, which defined 'accidental' as 'happening un-
expectedly." ' 122 Hartford argued that, when read together, these definitions
made it clear that Hartford was applying "the Wickman standard during the
administrative process."123
The majority flatly rejected this contention.'24 The court reasoned that
applying Wickman would necessarily involve discussing whether Schanus's
death was "highly likely to occur." 125 Noting the obvious difference in the
language used, the court reasoned that the phrase "could be expected" merely
"begs the question whether 'expected' means 'reasonably foreseeable' or
'highly likely." '126 The court concluded that "this case falls in the category
where an administrator offers a post hoc rationale during litigation to justify a
decision reached on different grounds during the administrative process.", 
27
Hartford alternatively argued that their denial was justified under the
policy exclusion for intentional self-inflicted injury.' 28 The court rejected this
argument for two reasons. First, the court explained that this would be an
unreasonable interpretation of the plan because it "renders meaningless other
important policy language";' 29 namely, the exclusion for injuries incurred
118. King, 414 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Marolt v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 146
F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1998)).
119. Id. at 1000-01.
120. Id. at 1000.
121. Id. at 1001 (quotation marks omitted).
122. Id. at 1003.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1006.
126. Id. at 1003.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1004. The policy provided, "[n]o benefit will be paid for a loss caused or
contributed to by ... (6) any intentionally self-inflicted injury, suicide, or attempted
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while under the influence of drugs.' 30 Second, the court dismissed Hartford's
argument as "another effort to uphold the administrator's decision with a post
hoc rationale."'131 The initial denial letter described Schanus's conduct as
becoming voluntarily drunk and exposing himself to an unnecessary dan-
ger. 32 The court reasoned that it was inconsistent to argue that becoming
intoxicated was the cause of death since the "unnecessary danger" Hartford
referred to was Schanus's resulting head injury - something Schanus exposed
himself to rather than something he inflicted on himself'
33
After rejecting Hartford's arguments for affirming the district court's
decision, the majority concluded that "the proper remedy is to return the case
to the administrator for reevaluation of the claim."' 34 The court noted that,
although ERISA gives courts the authority for a wide range of remedial pow-
ers, 35 most courts have determined that "the better course... is to return the
case to the administrator, rather than to conduct de novo review under a plan
interpretation offered for the first time in litigation." 136
B. Concurring Opinion
137
The concurrence had two main objectives: (1) to bolster the majority's
determination that remanding the case to the plan administrator was the
proper remedy, 138 and (2) to counter the dissent's contention that the court
should not disturb the administrator's denial unless the underlying definition
of "accident" was unreasonable.
39
130. Id. at 1005. The drug exclusion stated "no benefit will be paid for a loss
caused or contributed to by (7) taking drugs, sedatives, narcotics, barbiturates, am-
phetamines or hallucinogens unless prescribed for or administered to you by a li-
censed physician." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
131. Id. at 1004.
132. Id. at 1000.
133. See id. at 1005.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000)). A denied claimant may bring suit "to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan." 29 U.S.C. § 132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
136. King, 414 F.3d at 1005. The court cited Schadler v. Anthem Life Insurance
Co. for this proposition, even though footnote 11 of that case states that "we do not
intend to create a steadfast rule that de novo review is never appropriate." 147 F.3d
388, 398 n.l l (5th Cir. 1998). Schadler stated that de novo may be appropriate
"where the administrator, despite repeated opportunities to do so, refuses to make a
ruling on an issue or where the administrator so delays making a decision that such
delay amounts to a failure to decide the issue." Id.
137. Judges Lay and Bye joined in Judge Bright's concurring opinion. King, 141
F.3d at 1006 (Bright, J., concurring).
138. See id.
139. See id. at 1007-08.
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In supporting the majority's remand to the plan administrator, the con-
currence argued that since Hartford did not have the benefit of the statistical
evidence now before the court, 140 the administrator "should be given an op-
portunity to correct its previous faulty administrative decision."' 14' The con-
currence specifically noted that this evidence tended to show that drunk-
driving deaths occur in less than one percent of all people arrested for drunk
driving. 42 The concurrence argued that on remand, Hartford could apply the
correct standard: "[w]hether a reasonable person, with background and char-
acteristics similar to the insured, would have viewed Schanus's injuries and
death as highly likely to occur as a result of Schanus's conduct."'
143
Next, the concurrence countered the dissent's argument that Hartford's
definition of "accident" was reasonable, stating that the dissent "d[id] not
consider the startling implications of this definition."' 144 The concurrence
pointed out that Hartford's and the common law definition of "accident" were
"at opposite poles."'' 45 Hartford's definition asked whether "the victim could
reasonably have expected to suffer the injury," whereas the common law
typically asked whether "the victim could reasonably have expected to escape
the injury."'146 The distinction is the focus of what is foreseeable: if "one can
reasonably expect to escape injury," then under the common law definition,
resulting injuries would be an accident "so long as the injury is not 'substan-
tially certain."'' ' 47 Under Hartford's definition, however, no reasonably fore-
seeable injuries are accidents. 18 Since a definition of accident must be ap-
plied in all circumstances, this type of definition "would deceive employees"
with illusory benefits because "people buy accident insurance to protect
themselves against their own negligence." 49 The concurrence concluded that
140. Id. at 1007.
141. Id. at 1006. Judge Bright stated: "I am quite sure that Hartford has spent
considerably more to defend its denial of Schanus's claim than it would have cost to
pay the claim itself. It is time now to reasonably and properly conclude Schanus's
claim on all the facts and the correct law." Id. at 1007.
142. Id. at 1007.
143. Id. (citing Wickman v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1088 (1st Cir.
1990)). This is essentially the Wickman test tailored to the facts of this case.
144. Id. at 1007-08.
145. Id. at 1008.
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1456 (5th Cir. 1995)).
148. Id. The concurrence demonstrated this concept by way of a few examples.
First, if a person is standing on a shaky stool while searching in a top shelf of a cup-
board, "it is reasonably foreseeable that she will fall and ... break her neck." Id. Also,
if a utility worker relies on his partner to cut the power to an electricity pole, "it is
reasonably foreseeable that he will be electrocuted." Id. Finally, if a man breaks the
speed limit while rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital, it is reasonably foresee-
able that he will crash the car resulting in injuries. Id. None of these would be covered




Wilbers: Wilbers: Alcohol-Related Car Accidents
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
denying coverage for all accidents except those resulting from bizarre circum-
stances would be inconsistent with the goals of an accident insurance plan.'
50
C. Dissenting Opinion''
The dissent conceptualized this case in terms of "one relatively straight-
forward issue": whether Hartford abused its discretion in denying Amber's
claim.'5 2 In reaching an alternate result, the dissent argued that the majority
"confused the issue.., by asserting that the Wickman test of 'highly likely to
occur,' rather than a 'reasonably foreseeable' standard, should govern" in
reviewing the claim denial.153 The dissent advanced two arguments to support
its position: (1) that the majority "misread[] the test set forth in Wickman,"
and (2) that the majority "read[] too much into Hartford's reliance on Wick-
man during litigation of this case."'
' 54
The dissent argued that "the Wickman test" was not a test at all.' 55 Given
that "accident" was already defined in the insurance policy and that definition
was bolstered by "fairly consistent" case law, "[t]he focus of Wickman was
not to formulate a generally applicable definition of accident. ' 56 'Rather, the
central issue in Wickman was whether the magistrate judge erroneously ap-
plied the policy's definition of accident . . . ." 57 Thus, the dissent character-
ized Wickman as "an analysis that gives 'substance' to a fact-finder's applica-
tion of the definition of accident by focusing on the reasonable expectations
of the insured."'158 This analysis, the dissent argued, did not focus on the like-
lihood of harm, but on whether an objectively reasonable person "would have
expected the result.'1
5 9
As a corollary to its first argument, the dissent asserted that Hartford
could not apply the Wickman test in denying Amber's claim because Hartford
also recognized that Wickman did not adopt a specific definition of acci-
150. Id. at 1009.
151. Judges Morris, Shepard, Arnold, Riley, and Chief Judge Loken joined in
Judge Gruender's dissenting opinion. Id. (Gruender, J., dissenting).
152. Id.




157. Id. The plan at issue in Wickman defined accident as an "unexpected, exter-
nal, violent and sudden event." Wickman v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1081
(1st Cir. 1990).
158. King, 414 F.3d at 1011 (Gruender, J., dissenting).
159. Id. The dissent noted that "the First Circuit's own application of the objective
analysis to Mrs. Wickman's claim is devoid of any discussion about whether a rea-
sonable person in Mr. Wickman's shoes would have viewed death as 'substantially'
or 'highly' likely to occur." Id.
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dent.' 60 Instead, Hartford "relied on the analytical framework of Wickman to
support its argument that the plan administrator's application of its interpreta-
tion of the term 'accidental' ... was reasonable."' In fact, Hartford argued,
"Mr. Schanus' expectations were manifestly unreasonable."' 62 Therefore, the
dissent concluded that Hartford had in fact never employed a "Wickman-like"
definition of accident, and that it would have been proper to simp analyze
whether Hartford abused its discretion in the claims denial process.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's remand to the plan administra-
tor] 64 Noting that the purpose of a deferential standard of review was to pro-
tect claimants from post hoc litigation rationales and to streamline the proce-
dure for disposing of claims, the dissent concluded the majority's remand
"undermine[d] these important ERISA concepts.'65 In distinguishing cases
the majority relied on, the dissent stated that in cases where remand was nec-
essary, the plan administrator had either not given reasons for denial or had not
interpreted the plan. '66 Because Hartford interpreted the plan terms, its interpre-
tation should only be overturned if it abused its discretion in doing so.'
67
The dissent explained how it would have resolved the issue. First, the
dissent would have applied the multi-factor test set forth in Finley v. Special
Agents Mutual Benefit Ass 'n, Inc., 68 under which the dissent concluded Hart-
ford did not abuse its discretion.' 69 Second, the dissent would have deter-
mined whether the plan administrator reasonably applied its interpretation to
the facts of Amber's claim by asking whether the decision was "adequately
supported by the evidence on record."'170
In applying all of the Finley factors, the dissent noted that Hartford's
two interpretations of "accident" in its denial letters were not as inconsistent
as the majority claimed. 7' Citing the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Diction-
ary definition of "' unexpected' as 'not expected: UNFORSEEN,"' the dissent
maintained that Hartford's denial letters were internally consistent, as well as
160. Id. at 1011-12.
161. Id.




166. Id. at 1014.
167. See id.
168. 957 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1992).
169. King, 414 F.3d at 1015 (Gruender, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1014-15 (quoting Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 900 (8th Cir.
1996)) (quotation marks omitted). The dissent paraphrased the test as whether the
plan administrator "offer[ed] a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence, for a
particular outcome." Id. (quoting Donaho, 74 F.3d at 899) (quotation marks omitted).
171. Id. at 1015.
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"consistent with the goals of the Hartford accidental-death policy."' 72 The
dissent also thought that this interpretation did not "render any language in
the policy meaningless or internally inconsistent." 17
3
Finally, the dissent addressed the contention that "Schanus's 'expecta-
tion of reaching home ... was not patently unreasonable."",174 This contention
was made in light of the new statistical evidence presented at trial showing
"the number of people who died as a result of drunk driving is less than 1% of
all individuals who are arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol." 75
The dissent reasoned that since this evidence was not presented to Hartford
during the claims denial process, Hartford did not abuse its discretion.76
In conclusion, the dissent surmised that since Hartford "reasonably in-
terpreted [the plan] and applied the terms," it did not abuse its discretion, and
therefore, the district court's judgment should have been affirmed. 177
V. COMMENT
The King decision leaves the law of accidental death benefits uncertain.
While the court seemed more sympathetic to Amber's claim than past deci-
sions denying accidental death benefits, it stopped short of determining con-
clusively whether Mr. Schanus's death was an accident. 178 Although unstated
in the court's opinion, the implication is that applying Wickman to alcohol-
related car wrecks no longer forecloses the possibility of finding that injuries
were "accidents." Consequently, King represents a step toward policy change
in the Eighth Circuit that has important practical consequences for insurance
companies with accidental death and dismemberment policies.
A. Inching toward Policy Change
Several factors indicate the Eighth Circuit's slightly changing stance on
alcohol-related car accidents, including its departure from previous decisions'
reasoning, the concurring opinion's discussion, and the inconsistency of its
underlying rationale.
172. Id. at 1015-16 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1286
(10th ed. 2002)).
173. Id. at 1016. Amber argued that this interpretation rendered the intentionally
self-inflicted injury exclusion meaningless, because it would exclude all foreseeable
risks of injury or death that were the consequence of an intentional act. Id. at 1016-17.
174. Id. at 1018 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
175. Id. (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1002-03 (majority opinion) (stating that it was "unnecessary and
inappropriate" to determine whether Hartford's definition of accident was reasonable).
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As previously discussed, courts have traditionally been unsympathetic to
claimants' arguments for treating alcohol-related car wrecks as accidents.
79
These courts have largely based their decisions on social intolerance for
drunk driving by reasoning that "the hazards of drinking and driving are
widely known and widely publicized,' 80 and therefore the insureds "knew, or
should have known, that [they were] risking [their lives] in [ ]real and meas-
urable way[s].,,18 This trend was questioned in Cozzie, 1 2 a Seventh Circuit
case, and West,'8 3 a district court decision from Iowa.
The Eighth Circuit's absence of discussion on this point is significant,
because before Cozzie and West, the emphasis on the social stigma was nearly
universal. 8 4 King, however, did not address this social stigma in its discus-
sion of the pertinent issues.18 5 In fact, the court noted that remanding the case
"permit[ted] the administrator to consider in the first instance evidence re-
ceived by the district court."' 18 6 Since this evidence was a statistical analysis
of the frequency of drunk-driving deaths,' 87 it appears that the court is hoping
Hartford will follow Cozzie and West on remand and rule that Schanus's
death was an accident. This would allow the court to refrain from making an
official application of Wickman to a drunk-driving accident.
The concurrence, however, was more willing to discuss the conse-
quences of applying the underlying definition of accident.' Judge Bright -
who also joined in the majority opinion - wrote the concurring opinion, in
179. See supra notes 84, 89, 94, 97, 101 and accompanying text.
180. Fowler v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 938 F. Supp 476, 480 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
181. Schultz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp 1419, 1422 (M.D. Fla. 1997);
see also Buhite & Marrero-Ladik, supra note 46, at 985-86 (stating that "where the
apparent cause of death was the result of ingestion of alcohol... the determination as
to whether a particular death was accidental ... is often impacted by societal biases,
assumptions, and beliefs").
182. Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1998).
183. West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 856, 901-02 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
184. Courts have typically upheld accidental death benefit denials in these cases
by determining that the injuries or deaths were not accidents or that they were self-
inflicted injuries. See supra Part III.B.
185. More directly, the Kind court rejected prior courts' determinations that alco-
hol-related injuries were "intentionally self-inflicted." King v. Hartford Life & Acci-
dent Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994, 1004-05 (8th Cir. 2005). At least two courts have ad-
vanced the line of reasoning the King court rejected. See Mullaney v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, 103 F. Supp. 2d 486, 495 (D.R.I. 2000) (citing with approval Nelson's
determination that applying a self-inflicted injury exclusion to an alcohol-related car
wreck was "eminently reasonable" (quoting Nelson v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada, 962 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (W.D. Mich. 1997))). The Eighth Circuit flatly
rejected this argument because it was a post hoc rationale and because it was "based
on an unreasonable interpretation of the plan." King, 414 F.3d at 1004.
186. King, 414 F.3d at 1006.
187. Id. at 997 n. 1.
188. See id. at 1006-08 (Bright, J., concurring).
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which he discussed the "startling implications" of Hartford's definition of
accident' 8 9 In stressing that the definition of accident should be applied to all
cases, the concurrence bolstered the majority's unstated message that drunk-
driving deaths are not likely reasonably foreseeable in light of statistical evi-
dence presented at trial. This is especially clear in the concurrence's state-
ments that Hartford's denial "would seem to make nonsense of the concept of
an 'accident." ' 190 The concurrence expressed the concerns suppressed by the
majority in dealing with the case on a procedural level. This is more evident
in light of the dissent's criticism of the majority's rationale.
The dissent pointed out that Hartford's first denial letter's reference to
the expectedness of injury might not be so different from its second denial
letter's reference to the foreseeability of injury.19 1 This suggestion is not with-
out precedent. Citing Cozzie, the court in West explained, "there is nothing
more than a semantic difference between" the concepts of "expectation" and
"foreseeability." 192 "Both concepts plainly involve the degree to which the
insured did or reasonably should have 'foreseen' or 'expected' the injury he
or she sustained."' 193 Therefore, it seems that the difference in language is not
as egregious as the majority perceived.
While ERISA requires the "specific reasons for... denial [to be] written
in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant,"' 94 the Eighth
Circuit seems to be requiring these reasons to be written in a more particular-
ized manner accepting nothing less than quoting prior cases. While this dis-
tinction may have significance in some contexts, the difference in discussing
whether an event is expected or whether it is foreseen has little significance
outside a courtroom. A claimant receiving a denial letter will not likely ap-
preciate the significance of such a fine distinction. The court's decision im-
plies that insurance companies should write denial letters in technical legal
terminology, which may be completely different from a letter "written... to
be understood by the participant."' 95 Whatever the reason, however, the
Eighth Circuit is becoming increasingly skeptical of insurance companies
who deny accidental death benefits to those injured in drunk-driving wrecks.
B. Practical Consequences
This step toward a change in policy has two important practical conse-
quences for accidental death benefit plans governed by ERISA. First, the
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1008.
191. Id. at 1015 (Gruender, J., dissenting).
192. West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 856, 886 (N.D. Iowa 2001)
(citing Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1998)).
193. Id.
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importance of an initial claims denial cannot be understated. Ultimately, the
different language in Hartford's denial letters precluded a favorable judgment
from the Eighth Circuit. To avoid a technical mishap, insurance companies
must take extra precaution in writing denial letters. Second, plan administra-
tors can no longer rely solely on the Wickman definition of accident when
denying accidental death benefits. To eliminate any uncertainty, plan admin-
istrators should include an alcohol-related exclusion in all accidental death
insurance plans.
The Eighth Circuit's decision places an added importance on the initial
claims denial letter. To eliminate any inconsistent language in the claims
review process, insurance companies may employ a form letter.' 96 These
letters, however, should not be written too broadly because the Eighth Circuit
has previously held such denials must state "specific reasons for the decision"
as opposed to "[b]ald-faced conclusions."' 197 The best course to avoid incon-
sistency appears to entail having several form letters to set forth the plan's
interpretation of certain plan terms, such as accident. In this case, if Hartford
sincerely intended to apply Wickman, a form letter should set forth the test as
an interpretation of the limited definition of "accident" given in the plan. Al-
though plan administrators would still have to apply the interpretation to each
case, the language so critical to the King court would already be spelled out
so that inadvertent mistakes could be avoided.
Thus, plan administrators would employ a format similar to one tradi-
tionally suggested for writing law school exam answers. "IRAC" is an acro-
nym that symbolizes the order in which to write a model law school essay
exam: issue, rule, application, conclusion. By setting forth the issue and rule
as part of the form letter, the insurance agent can then simply apply the rule
for each individual claim and state a conclusion. The benefit of having the
term defined and rule stated in a form letter is allowing the pertinent language
structure the subsequent analysis. These form letters cannot replace specific
case-by-case analysis, 98 but they can eliminate any inadvertently inconsistent
language that may result in a court overturning the denial.
Insurance companies may no longer safely stretch the general definition
of accident or apply a self-inflicted injury exclusion to avoid paying accidental
death benefits in drunk-driving cases. To achieve the same result, benefit plans
should contain a specific exclusion for alcohol-related accidents. Critics have
previously argued for the need and applicability of specific exclusions for inju-
ries incurred while intoxicated or while committing crimes. 199 This would have
the salutary effect of providing explicit notice to insured employees and stream-
196. 27 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 61:49 (2005).
197. Richardson v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 645 F.2d 660,
665 (8th Cir. 1981).
198. 27 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 61:49 (recommending that form letters "should con-
tain several alternatives that can be checked in regard to each of the notice require-
ments and space for specifying any matters peculiar to an individual case").
199. See Gardner, supra note 9, at 251-52.
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lining the ERISA claims process by reducing subsequent litigation, thereby
addressing two concerns expressed by the concurrence and dissent in King.2° °
There are three different ways to write an alcohol exclusion: using gen-
eral terms, using state law to define intoxication, and using a specific blood
alcohol percent. A generally phrased alcohol exclusion will prevent acciden-
tal death benefits in cases where death results, in any way, from alcohol or
intoxication. 20 Causation is an important issue in the phrasing of nearly all
202
alcohol exclusions. It is also the main issue when applying a generally
phrased exclusion because it covers such a broad range of scenarios.20 3 "Most
courts," however, "find that such an exclusion prevents coverage when the
carrier meets [the] burden of showing that the death was caused directly or
,204indirectly by the insured's intoxication." Therefore, "[m]ost policies...
incorporate some causation element." 2° 5 This causation provision may be de-
fined very broadly, to include "any loss ... caused directly, indirectly, wholly
,,206
or partly by... being intoxicated. The upside for those insured under plans
with this type of language is that it affords slightly more notice of when the
plan will provide coverage and when it will not. On the other hand, insurance
200. The concurrence noted that allowing insurance companies to exclude accident
coverage for foreseeable injuries "would deceive employees - attracting them to a job
with the promise of benefits that turn out, when they are claimed, to be illusory." King
v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994, 1008 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bright, J.,
concurring). The dissent also criticized the majority's decision to remand the case to the
plan administrator because it was inconsistent with "'ERISA's purpose of streamlining
and shortening the timeframe for disposing of claims."' Id. at 1012 (Gruender, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Schadler v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 1998)).
201. See Sylvester v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 42 P.3d 38, 40 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that insurer did not have to prove alcohol was the predominant cause of
death where policy stated "This Certificate does not cover death which results directly
or indirectly, in whole or in part, from ... (e) injury occurring while under the influ-
ence of alcohol." (alteration in original)).
202. See, e.g., Burgess v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir.
1999). Although the policy at issue contained a specific blood alcohol percent exclusion,
the court used an interesting hypothetical to illustrate its point: "If a man who was cov-
ered by this exact policy was sitting on his porch after having a few beers (rendering his
BAC greater than 0.10%) were to be struck by a meteor, would his beneficiaries be able
to collect? From the language of the policy, the answer is clearly no." Id.
203. See Buhite & Marrero-Ladik, supra note 46, at 991.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 992.
206. Giangreco v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 168 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(holding that the quoted definition was enforceable). Using "intoxicated" as the stan-
dard allows state law to define intoxication, and prevents any dispute about whether
setting a specific blood alcohol content usurps the state law definition. See Buhite &
Marrero-Ladik, supra note 46, at 991-92 (citing Holloway, 190 F.3d 966 (holding that
the alcohol level conflicted with Illinois law)).
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companies retain a significant amount of flexibility to apply the clause to a
wide variety of cases - including those that may actually be accidents. 20 7
Some plan exclusions deny coverage where the insured is injured while
"legally intoxicated," although this approach has pros and cons as well. Using
state statutes to define intoxication allows for plan flexibility across several
states and provides those insured with fair notice of the level of intoxication
at which coverage is denied. But using state statutes also presents unique
problems. First and foremost, many state laws criminalize driving while in-
toxicated, as opposed to criminalizing public drunkenness. 20 8 Thus, a death
that does not occur as a result of drunk driving would not be excluded. 209 To
apply the state standard of legally intoxicated outside the drunk driving con-
text, insurance companies must specify which activities it will cover.2 t0 This
specification can be cumbersome for insurance companies, but the insured
would be better informed.
Perhaps the clearest approach is to simply define a blood alcohol content
at which injuries and deaths are no longer deemed accidental. Policies follow-
ing this approach will state that they deny benefits for death that "occurs
while the Covered Person's blood-alcohol level is. 10 percent... or higher."2 1'
However, the causation issue would likely require adding some language such
as indicating that injury and death must be a result of this heightened blood-
207. See, e.g., Sylvester v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 42 P.3d 38, 39 (Colo. Ct. App.
2001) (upholding denial of accidental death benefits where insured consumed alcohol
with her regularly taken prescription medication despite a warning on the prescription
not to do so).
208. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Clause in Life, Accident, or Health
Policy Excluding or Limiting Liability in Case of Insured's Use of Intoxicants or
Narcotics, 100 A.L.R. 5th 617, § 4 (2002) (stating that provisions using state law will
only apply where the policy limits the statute to certain situations, or where "the in-
jury or death occurs under circumstances for which the applicable state law provides a
specific blood alcohol content for intoxication"). Missouri statutes pose this problem,
in that Missouri defines its legal intoxication limit at "eight-hundredths of one per-
cent" for the crime of "[d]riving with excessive blood alcohol content." Mo. REV.
STAT. § 577.012 (2000).
209. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Union Pac. R.R. Employees' Hosp. Ass'n, 471 N.W.2d
438, 441 (Neb. 1991). Although Mahoney's situation was somewhat different, the same
principles apply. Mahoney injured herself after falling down stairs while intoxicated and
was seeking reimbursement of medical expenses under a medical insurance plan that
contained an alcohol exclusion defined by state law. Id. at 439-40. The court affirmed a
judgment in her favor and agreed that "there is no legal limit for nondriving intoxication
in Nebraska, and therefore the policy exclusion is inapplicable." Id. at 441.
210. See id. at 441 (stating that "[i]f the Association wanted the intoxication limits
as prescribed in [the drunk driving statute] to apply to injuries sustained while danc-
ing, walking, riding a bicycle, or any other activity, it should have specified these
activities in the policy.").
211. Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966, 967 (7th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing the quoted language to be unambiguous and enforceable).
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alcohol level.212 Such policies have been upheld even though consumption of
alcohol is in itself a legal activity. 213 This approach adds the benefit of clear
notice to the insured of the limits of their coverage, which may eliminate liti-
gated disputes about the meaning or interpretation of policy terms.214
While these provisions may not abrogate accidental death benefits in all
circumstances, 215 they almost certainly would have precluded accidental
death benefits in King.2 16 Either way, however, the exclusion moves the focus
in litigation of these cases away from the stigma of drunk driving and pro-
vides insured employees fair notice of what conduct will be excluded under
their benefit plan.
VI. CONCLUSION
While not a watershed decision, King represents a growing uneasiness
among courts in declaring that drunk-driving deaths are not accidents. Although
a ruling on the merits would have added certainty to an uncertain area of law,
the Eighth Circuit delayed that ruling for another case. That does not mean,
however, that the King decision is altogether meaningless. Viewing this deci-
sion as a step toward policy change notifies insurance companies and employ-
ers of the need to revise the terms of employee accidental death plans and cor-
responding claims processes. These practical measures essentially preempt any
future Eighth Circuit decision holding that a drunk-driving death is an accident.
MARCUS WILBERS
212. But see Chmiel, 158 F.3d at 969 (stating "[u]nder the terms of this exclusion,
no connection between the blood-alcohol level and the death need necessarily be
shown by the insurer."). It is important to note, however, that the plaintiff "made no
attempt to" show that the insured's death was not caused by alcohol. Id.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Burgess v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 1137, 1139 (7th Cir.
1999) (stating "both parties agree[] that the insurance policy is unambiguous").
215. This is particularly true when the intoxicated insured dies in a multi-car
wreck and there are issues of fact as to which motorist was at fault. See Giangreco v.
U.S. Life Ins. Co., 168 F. Supp. 2d 417, 422-23 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also Buhite &
Marrero-Ladik, supra note 46, at 992-93.
216. Causation would not have been an issue in Schanus's death, because he died in
a single-vehicle accident and his blood-alcohol content was 0.19%, significantly higher
than the legal limit in Minnesota. See King v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 414
F.3d 994,996-97 (8th Cir. 2005); see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.20, Subd. 1(5) (2001).
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